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Legal Consequences of Standard Setting for Competitive Athletes With 
Cardiovascular Abnormalities 
JOHN C. WEISTART, JD, LLD 
This paper addresses the issue of whether establishing 
consensQs standards for the treatment of particular med•
ical conditiQns increases a physician's exposure t9 legal 
liability. The conclusion reached is that the legal etTects 
of standard setting, rather than representing a signifi•
cant threat of liability, should be seen as beneficial to 
the medical profession. A fUQdamental point is that the 
legal test for liability is entirely depende~t on the medical 
profession's definition of what constitutes adequate care. 
The law incorporates the standard of care defined by the 
medi~aI profession and does not impose an external norm. 
In the absence of formally stilted standards, the process 
of defining relevant medical ~riteria will involve a grfat 
"eal of uncertainty. Outcomes of legal contests will be 
atTected by such extraneous factors as the relative ex-
A Bethesda Conference sets qualitative standards for cardiac 
care and undoubtedly gives rise to questions about the po•
tential liability consequences for practicing physicians. Some 
participants may be concerned that form'll standards will 
produce automatic liability for practitioners w~o fail to sat•
isfy the announced criteria. Others may feel that even if 
liability is flot automatic. its threat will be greatly increased 
because certain practices will now more obviously fail to 
measure up against an announced norm. In any event. it 
will frequefltly be assumed that the physician' s exposure to 
the cost~ and turmoil of litigation will be enhanced. 
If this were true. there would be rather ominous public 
policy ilT)plications. In effect. the medical profession would 
be discouraged from pursuing the improvelT)enl of patient 
care. Equally troubling would be the fact thiH it was the law 
and le~al concerns that operated to deter better medical 
pracrice. The jurisprudential justification for a legal regime 
that had such an effect would be f'lr from obvious. At least 
since the 13th century, it has b~en assumed that a regime 
of law should operate toimprov~ the human conqition. 
This paper attempts to proyiq~ reassurance that the law 
is nQt antagonistic to professional standard setting. Indeed. 
the essential message is even more po~itive: not only are 
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perience of the lawyers involved, their access to knowl•
edgeable expert witnesses, and their strategic decisions 
made with respect to tactics and proced!lres. Establish•
ment of forlllal standards has the salutofY etTect of lim•
iting the influence of these factors and thus reducing the 
randomness of the results reached. Formal standards 
also have the advantage of being easily replicatect in 
unrelated proceedings and thereby contribute to the de•
ve!opment of a consistent, evenly applied rule of liability. 
Finally, even if formal standards are either ~ore, or 
less, progressive than the actual state of medical prac•
tice, there is relatively little risk that they will produce 
untoward results. 
(1 Am Cpll Cardiol1985;6:1191-7) 
liability implications not ominous. but the I.\ltimate legal 
result may be quite favorable for the medical profession 
itself. If carefully devised and properly disseminated. stan•
dards such as those developed at Bethesda Conferences should 
have the effect of reducing. rather than increasing. the in•
stances of inappropriate legal intervention. 
First Principles: The Relation Between 
Legal Liability and the Standards of the 
Medical Profession 
A discussion of the legal effects of standard setting ben•
efits from a clarification of the relation between legal liability 
and tpe criteria that the medical profession itself uses to 
juqge the acceptability of a physician's mode of practice. 
Despite the considerable public and professional attention 
given to the legal implications of medical malpractice. a 
surprising degree of misunderstanding exists on the corre•
lation between the independent assessments of the profes•
sion and the outcomes that obtain in legal proceedings. A 
cqmmop misperceptipn, not confined to physicians. is that 
the ultimate goal of the law of medical malpractice is to tell 
doctors how to practice. or at least to make their professional 
behavior conform to norms that are legally defined. The 
goal of the law is actually quite different. however. Vlti-
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LEGAL LIABILITY ILL): 
The Range Within Which 
the Law Will Find Liability 
\ 
• 
INADEQUATE PROFESSIONAL 
PRACTICE (IPP) 
Level of Medical Care That Would 
Be Disapproved Under 
Professional Medical Standards 
Figure 1. Symbols used to illustrate the relation between the scope 
of legal liability (LL) and inadequate professional practice (lPP), 
that is, the internal assessment of the medical profession, regarding 
whether a particular course of treatment is adequate. The symbol 
on the left depicts the range within which the law will find liability. 
The symbol on the right represents the sphere of medical care that 
would be disapproved under professional medical standards. 
mately, the law is very deferential to the medical profes•
sion's own efforts to define the acceptable level of practice. 
The essential points for our purpose can be illustrated by 
a series of representations. The symbols we use are found 
in Figure I. The figure with the vertical lines, positioned 
on the left, depicts the range of legal liability. This is the 
sphere in which medical professionals are found to have 
legal liability to patients in cases involving alleged mal•
practice. We will identify this area as simply "legalliabil•
ity" (LL). The other symbol with horizontal lines covers a 
different field. Here we are concerned only about the profes•
sional judgments of the medical profession itself. Our il•
lustration on the right represents actions that would be judged 
to be unacceptable by the profession quite apart from any 
legal consequences. This field is denominated "inadequate 
professional performance" (IPP). Again, the important 
question for our purposes is the relation between the two 
assessments represented here, one legal and one medical 
(I). 
Figure 2. Representation of the overzealous plaintiff lawyer's 
view of physician accountability. From this perspective, the range 
of inadequate professional performance (IPP) by the physicians is 
extensive but only a small portion of this leads to actual legal 
liability (LL). In short, the view expressed here is that the law is 
underprotective of injured plaintiffs. 
LL 
IPP 
LL 
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Figure 3. Representation of the disgruntled physician's view of 
legal liability. The actual range of inadequate professional per•
formance (IPP) is thought to be small, but the sphere of legal 
liability (LL) is vast. Legal awards of damages are frequently seen 
as arbitrary, bearing little relation to the actual circumstances of 
professional malpractice. 
Some have a misconception that is illustrated in Figure 
2. This might be taken, in a bit of overstatement, as indi•
cating the view held by overzealous plaintiffs' lawyers. 
From this perspective, inadequate professional performance 
abounds, but only a small segment of it ever results in legal 
liability. In short, physicians are only rarely made to account 
for their malpractice. 
A level of misunderstanding that is equally imbued with 
hyperbole is shown in Figure 3. Here we have the disgrun•
tled physician's view of the world. As seen by this person, 
a physician experiences tremendous exposure to legal lia•
bility, but very little such liability is based on professional 
performance that is actually inadequate. 
Neither of these views need detain us very long, for they 
represent the emotional extremes of the present malpractice 
debate. A more serious effort is illustrated in Figure 4, which 
attempts to depict how the world really works. In this il•
lustration, we are mainly interested in the general relation 
that is revealed. The details of the configuration will almost 
certainly be subject to debate. Some will argue that there 
should be more, or less, overlap. Others might dispute whether 
the size of the two fields should be shown as equal. But 
Figure 4. Representation of a more realistic view of the interaction 
of legal and professional assessments of the adequacy of treatment. 
Some inadequate professional performance (IPP) goes unac•
counted, and occasionally legal liflbility (LL) is imposed without 
the support of a disapproving medical judgment. At the core, 
however, there is considerable coalescence between medical as•
sessments of inadequate performance and the imposition of legal 
liability. 
LL 
IPP 
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Figure 5. Representation of the ideal of the law. Under the pre•
vailing legal rule, liability should be imposed only in those in•
stances in which the medical profession itself would find the course 
of treatment to be inadequate. The law does not impose an external 
norm, but rather incorporates the medical profession's determi•
nation of what constitutes adequate performance. 
even with these matters unresolved, Figure 4 can be taken 
to suggest that our legal system operates imperfectly, Lia•
bility is sometimes imposed when there is little or no support 
for such an outcome in the internal professional assessment. 
This is illustrated by the segment on the far left. By the 
same token, not all instances of inadequate professional 
performance result in the imposition of liability. Even when 
cases are taken to litigation, imprecision in our litigation 
procedures and inadequacy in our fact-finding process often 
leave the deficient performance unremedied. 
But we need not be content with this reality. Indeed, the 
aspiration of the law is quite different. This is represented 
by Figure 5. The point here is that the goal of the law is to 
base legal liability on the judgments that are made within 
the medical profession. The law strives for a rather precise 
correlation between the assessments of the medical profes•
sion as to what is good or bad practice and the instances in 
which legal liability results. 
Legal Standards for Defining Liability 
This aspiration is reflected in the legal standards that 
courts announce for defining instances of liability. For ex•
ample, a common formulation of the physician's duty of 
care for liability purposes is as follows: 
[AJ physician is under a duty to use that degree of care and 
skill which is expected of a reasonably compettmt practi•
tioner in the same class [or speciality J to which he belongs, 
acting in the same or similar circumstances. (2) 
The important point for our inquiry is that in this statement, 
all referents for the applicable standard of care are internal 
to the profession. We are admonished to look to "the degree 
of care and skill" of "a'reasonably competent practitioner." 
Moreover, the standard is speciality specific, for we are to 
look to practitioners of "the same class." Notably, what is 
missing from this test is any suggestion that an external 
norm is being imposed. Physicians are not told to save 
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patients from all harm. Nor are they directed to take all 
steps that would reduce harm (3). 
The inward-looking character of the standard for medical 
malpractice contrasts with that used to define negligence in 
most other settings. The more common definition of neg•
ligence-the one applied to determine liability in industrial 
accidents and negligence-based products liability cases•
does not look solely to custom in identifying the appropriate 
level of care. Indeed, it is recognized that the prevailing 
custom may itself give rise to an unacceptable risk of harm 
(4). 
The rationale for applying a special, more deferential 
liability standard to physicians is itself the source of some 
debate (5). The most plausible explanation is found in the 
profession's long history of self-regulation. In our Anglo•
American legal system, the prerogatives given to the guilds 
of 16th century London seem to have been particularly in•
fluential in shaping later developments (6). Indeed, the med•
ical profession, perhaps more than any other field of en•
deavor including the law, has maintained a strong allegiance 
to the norm of peer governance and internal enforcement 
(7). The premise of a guild was that it afforded an adequate 
mechanism for quality control and that it was uniquely suited 
to make knowledgeable judgments in its specialized field 
of endeavor. As questions of the adequacy of professional 
performance moved from the tribunal of the guild to the 
more public venue of the court, the substantive standard did 
not change drastically (8). 
While the rule in Figure 5 is the traditional one, it may 
be worth noting that there are other potential standards that 
are debated by those interested in law reform. One alter•
native is given in Figure 6. The premise of this view is that 
the law should be prepared to extend the range of liability 
slightly beyond the bounds of existing medical custom. Ac•
cording to the proponents, pure reliance on custom will be 
too insular at times, and some external mechanism is needed 
Figure 6. A futuristic and proposed reform of the standard of 
legal liability. Under the view presented here, the range of legal 
liability would be defined somewhat more broadly than the range 
of negative professional assessments. Proponents of this approach 
suggest that it would provide the medical profession with height•
ened incentives to review and improve its customs. 
LL 
IPP 
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to ensure that the highest priority is given to reducing harm 
to patients. At least one case gives some credence to this 
view (9), but it remains highly controversial (10). 
Yet another approach abandons the insistence on proof 
of negligence as a deviation from professional custom (11). 
Under this standard of so-called strict liability, the critical 
question is whether the injury that resulted to the patient 
was preventable. If it was, then proponents of that view 
would award compensation to the patient (12). This result 
would obtain without regard to whether prevailing custom 
would have required that the special preventive steps be 
taken. The avowed objective of such an arrangement is to 
provide a mechanism for spreading the costs of practice•
related disabilities among all patients who use medical ser•
vices. Cost spreading would be achieved as practitioners 
were forced to raise their fees to all patients to cover the 
expense of the now more extensive reimbursement system 
(13). 
But again, for our immediate purpose the traditional rule 
deferring to prevailing medical custom is the pertinent one. 
As suggested, this standard does not seek to control or 
manipulate the medical profession. Rather, it is incorpo•
rative: the profession's standard of reasonable care is that 
which should control legal results. 
Pertinence of Custom in Professional 
Standard Setting 
It might reasonably be asked why the real world looks 
more like Figure 4 than Figure 5. Why, in short, is the 
aspiration of the law not achieved? A full exploration of 
that issue would be quite elaborate and would most likely 
excite great controversy. The list of defects, real and de•
batable, could cover numerous aspects of our litigation sys•
tem. For our purposes, though, we can identify a few fea•
tures that are particularly important. 
1) Problems in proving medical custom. A central is•
sue in any medical litigation involves the matter of proving 
the standard of care to be applied. The inquiry is essentially 
one into the prevailing professional assumptions about what 
constitutes adequate diagnosis and treatment in the particular 
case. This issue is subject to an adversarial examination of 
the sort applied to other disputed points of litigation. 
The device typically used to establish the prevailing stan•
dard is, of course, the expert witness. Each side is entitled 
to produce experts to develop its own peculiar-and often 
self-serving-view of what constitutes good care. The tes•
timony of the competing experts is often conflicting, and 
the reasons for the conflicts vary. As medical practitioners 
well know, within the profession itself there will often be 
differences of opinion as to what amounts to proper caution. 
Sometimes the uncertainty is a product of incomplete sci•
entific information in an absolute sense. At other times, the 
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differences reflect differences in the training, perspective or 
skill of the expert. Further, the suspicion that some experts 
are largely "hired guns" is frequently articulated. 
As if these variables did not produce uncertainty enough, 
the lawyers for the respective parties can have a great effect 
on the accuracy and completeness of the inquiry. For ex•
ample, lawyers differ in terms of their access to perceptive, 
knowledgeable experts. The solo practitioner for whom this 
is his or her first malpractice case will do less well at pro•
ducing reliable witnesses than an experienced law firm de•
fending a sophisticated medical center. In addition, lawyers 
for each side will make strategic judgments that affect the 
reliability of the evidence on the relevant medical stan•
dard. Not all of these judgments will be good. Either lawyer 
may fail to call a critical witness. Or a strategic error may 
be made in the lawyers' declining to cross-examine certain 
witnesses, a choice frequently made for other reasons (14). 
Or it may tum out that the jury was greatly influenced by 
a witness's arrogance, rather than the substance of what he 
said. In short, the process of proving medical custom is 
subject to a wide variety of influences that could undermine 
the reliability of the results reached. 
2) Specific effects of standard setting. It is against this 
background that the substantive standard setting of this Be•
thesda Conference and similar professional efforts can be 
judged. The most significant legal effect of conscientiously 
devised standards is likely to be on the process of proving 
medical custom (15). There are many respects in which 
standard setting can be beneficial both to the legal process 
and to the medical profession that is having its practices 
reviewed. There are several effects that should be specifi•
cally noted. 
For example, carefully devisedformal standards will re•
duce the randomness of legal results. The point here is 
implicit in the analysis offered before. Uncertainty as to the 
relevant medical standard contributes to errors in legal out•
comes. In the absence of defined standards, the litigation 
has an open-ended quality that increases the likelihood that 
outcomes will be affected by the factors mentioned above, 
such as the relative experience of the lawyers involved or 
the strength of strategy decisions that are made. Since lit•
igation is a dynamic process, these influences will never be 
completely minimized. Nonetheless, the existence of formal 
professionally approved standards will make the proof of 
prevailing customs much more certain (16). In short, stan•
dards hold the prospect of yielding a reliable and under•
standable statement of what constitutes prevailing practice. 
The medical profession presumably would find it more 
attractive to define custom through standard setting than 
through the alternative of definition by litigation. The latter 
inquiry has a decidely ad hoc character. The statement of 
prevailing practice devised in one case will not necessarily 
have great weight in the next case that is litigated. In ad•
dition, a very compelling attraction of formal standard set-
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ting is its capacity to increase the control that the profession 
exercises over the norm against which it will be held to 
account. At this conference at least, the process of propos•
ing, debating and finalizing standards is wholly within the 
hands of the profession, 
A further point can be made: 
Standards are inevitable. A significant difference between 
formal and informal standards is the accuracy with which 
they can be reproduced in legal proceedings. 
In most areas of medical practice, there will be a custom. 
The custom may emphasize individual discretion and thus 
be highly idiosyncratic, but it will exist. At its essence, the 
notion of custom is simply a description of what knowl•
edgeable practitioners do in diagnosing and treating partic•
ular conditions. But as we have suggested, customs become 
the relevant standards for liability purposes. Since customs 
are inevitable, standards will also necessarily exist. 
An example may be in order. One of the issues addressed 
in this Bethesda Conference concerns the extent to which 
asymptomatic patients with atherosclerotic coronary artery 
disease should be discouraged from participating in com•
petitive sports. Let us assume that while there are some 
cardiologists who would not impose significant restrictions 
on the activities of such individuals, most practitioners would 
advise patients with coronary artery disease to refrain from 
strenuous sports. One can readily imagine the circumstances 
in which the issue of participation would become important. 
Assume that a patient with diagnosed coronary artery disease 
asked his physician if he could regularly play in a basketball 
league at the local YMCA. Assume that the endeavor was 
approved, but that the patient later suffered a myocardial 
infarction and died in the course of play. The patient's estate 
sues the treating physician, alleging that insufficient profes•
sional caution was shown. 
If there were a formal standard in existence advising 
against vigorous competitive activity by patients with coro•
nary artery disease, that measure would provide the focal 
point for the inquiry into liability. As will be explained 
below, the formal standard would only be probative, and 
not determinative, on the question of liability. It would, 
however, be the starting point from which the liability ap•
praisal proceeded. But in the absence of such a stated norm, 
each side in the proceeding would attempt to establish the 
informal or de facto standard that operated in the profession. 
As we have framed the problem, there is a substantial seg•
ment of opinion that would discourage participation even 
in the absence of a formal statement. And there are some 
who take a different view. These perspectives would have 
to be weighed to determine the norm of the profession. Once 
that standard is established, it would then be the criterion 
against which the particular physician's performance was 
judged. 
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Thus, the choice facing a professional group is not whether 
there should be standards. Rather, the important choice, 
from a legal perspective, is how clearly and accurately those 
standards will be stated. For some procedures the prevailing 
practice may be sufficiently clear that little is gained by a 
formalization of the standard. But for many areas of medical 
practice, this will not be the case. The setting of formal 
standards can have the effect of memorializing prevailing 
customs into a form that can be restated with a level of 
accuracy that the profession should find desirable. 
3) Deviations between standards and custom. Much 
of what has been said to this point assumes that we have 
standards that show a strong fidelity to prevailing customs. 
This premise is, of course, quite optimistic. Formal stan•
dards will vary in the degree to which they accurately portray 
the present state of medical practice. Some may be too 
general to be useful. Others may be accurate when devised 
but quickly become dated with subsequent technologic de•
velopments. In other cases, the standards will have simply 
missed the mark. The group devising the standard may have 
been more-or less-demanding than the profession 
generally. 
The pertinent legal standard will take account of these 
variations. An important legal concept provides the flexi•
bility needed to deal with deficiencies in the formal stan•
dards. As a legal matter, such measures are only "some 
evidence" of the prevailing standard of the profession (17). 
Stated in another way, the ultimate question will always be: 
what is the prevailing custom? Courts are directed to con•
sider all evidence that contributes to the clarification of that 
point. A formal standard, if it exists, is certainly relevant 
evidence. But it is not conclusive. The court will consider 
all proffers of proof that bear on the matter of custom, 
including any which limit or qualify the formal criteria. 
Several important corol~aries flow from these observations. 
The actual legal effect of a set of formal standards will 
depend on the weight of the professional judgment sup•
porting them. 
Also, 
A physician's deviation from a formal standard will not 
automatically result in liability. Liability will result only if 
the standard in fact conforms to prevailing custom. 
The former point can be taken as an assurance that at 
least from the legal perspective, professionally devised stan•
dards will not inhibit further scientific and technologic de•
velopments. Each such development will operate as a re•
finement or qualification of the norm stated in the formal 
standard. The task for those charged with developing evi•
dence in a legal proceeding will be not only to show the 
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formal standard but also to establish the extent to which it 
has been qualified in practice. 
Goal of Standard Setting 
It should also be recognized that standard setting under•
taken by a profession often has a different goal than merely 
codifying or restating existing levels of practice. Indeed, 
standard setting often is and should be aspirational. That is, 
the professional pronouncements may seek to advance the 
state of practice to a level higher than is reflected by the 
existing norm. Thus, the formally stilted standards may seek 
to quicken the acceptance of new techniques. Or the stan•
dards may incorporate respected judgments about which of 
two or more competing schools of treatment is to be preferred. 
Such aspirational st&ndards will not increase the practi•
tioner's exposure to liability if the pertinent legal rules are 
properly brought to bear. The aspirational charact!!r of a 
rule would itself be a topic for examination through appro•
pri~te evidence. The essence of the proof would be that 
custom had not yet moved to the position of embracing the 
suggested measure. 
To illustrate the point, we might return to the earlier 
example of the aSYTI1ptomatic patient with coronary artery 
disease who is approved for participation in a competitive 
YMCA basketball league. Recall that we posited that med•
ical opinion was somewhat divided over tne question of 
whether a physician should recommend agilinst particip~tion 
in these circumstances. However, let us posit further th~t 
even before the adoption of a formal s!andanL mos~ prac•
titioners in fact cautioned against strenuous activity in these 
circumstances. The point to be made in the present context 
is that the adoption of a formal standard incorporating the 
majority position would not automatically invalidate the 
views of those who had been more permissive in ~llowing 
competitive activity by their patients. It is quite conceivable 
that in some regions of the country the array of expe!1 
witnesses supporting an expansive view on participation by 
patients with coronary artery disease would be sufficie?tly 
impressive to support a legal finding that the stated standar~ 
was not controlling. 
Impact of Formal Standards 
Some readers may feel a bit uneasy with one implication 
of the above analysis. Physicians are not alone in suspecting 
that the law of!en drifts in a sea of indeterminancy. The 
question arises: are the preceding paragraphs to be taken to 
meiln that formal standards have no meaning beyond the 
separate proof that establishes their relation to existing prac•
tice? And if one must show the state of existing practice in 
any case, what have ~he standards added? In short, do formal 
standarps really make any difference? " 
Readers should be assured that from the perspective of 
the I~w', formal standards have a significant impact, even 
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though their pertinency is always subject to separate veri•
fication. For one thing, formal standards can greatly fore•
shorten the search for prevailing custom and thus save the 
energies of courts and' litigants. Standards devised by an 
authoritative group only require modest evidence to estab•
lish that they reflect prevailipg custom. Of perhaps even 
greater importance is the fact that formal stand~rds have the 
effect of significantly narrowipg the range of potential in•
quiry. Where there is no formal standard for the medical 
procedure in q~es~ion, the law-trained participants in a legal 
controversy will be given wide discretion in selecting their 
offers of proof. Misundersta~dings and omissions can have 
a significant effect Qn the ultimate outcome. By contrast, 
with a formal standard, the inquiry into custom does not 
begin at point zero. Rather, the standard itself establishes 
an elevat!!d baseline, and the function of other proof is to 
examine its reflection of actual custom. Deviations between 
the standard and custom will often be of modest proportion. 
A Procedural COl1cern: The \yisdom 
of Updating 
The effectiveness of any standard will eventually de•
crease over time. Increased experience and improved tech•
nology will qualify what was formerly the accepted pre•
vailing wisdom. Standards reflecting that wisdom will thus 
become dated. At some point in this natural aging process, 
the standards will drop into legal obscurity. 
For the reasons given previously for preferring formal 
over informal standards, it is appropriate for the Bethesda 
Conference group to consider providing for periodic up•
dating of its recommendations. Such reevaluations are nec•
essary to insure the currency, and thus the authority, of the 
standards. Moreover, such perioqic review will serve to 
minimize the extent to which considennions of legal strategy 
and attorney resourcefulness influence liability results. 
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